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We investigate the relationship between the slope of the wage-tenure profile and the level of 
monitoring across two cross sections of matched employer-employee British data. Our 
theoretical model predicts that increased monitoring leads to a decline in the slope of the 
wage-tenure profile. Our empirical analysis provides strong support for this prediction. 
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I. Introduction 
Efficiency wage theory predicts that firms can elicit effort from their employees by paying 
supra-competitive (i.e. efficiency) wages and/or by devoting resources to monitoring. This 
trade-off between the level of remuneration and monitoring has been examined extensively in 
the literature. Supportive evidence is found by Groshen and Krueger (1990), Rebitzer (1995), 
Krueger (1991), Kruse (1992), Ewing and Payne (1999). Unsupportive evidence is found by 
Neal (1993), Fitzroy and Kraft (1986) and Brunello (1995). 
A third option available to the firm is to tilt the remuneration package over time such 
that the lure of higher future earnings acts as a deterrent to current shirking. The positive 
correlation between experience and earnings is one of the most robust and uncontentious 
findings in labour economics - for surveys of the literature, see Polachek and Siebert (1992) 
and Lazear (2000). It has long been observed that worker productivity is inexorably linked to 
the form of the compensation scheme [Mitchell et al. (1990)]. From the early work of 
Johnson (1950), Cheung (1969) and Ross (1973), a recurring theme of this literature is that 
the divergence of interests and the asymmetry of information between principal and agent 
cause output to depend upon the contingent nature of the compensation contract. The 
prohibitive cost of monitoring worker performance necessitates compensation schemes that 
induce workers to self-select behaviour the firm considers to be optimal. One method of 
doing this is to defer a substantial component of compensation until the later years of tenure. 
Such a wage profile provides a penalty for shirking and thereby encourages workers to work 
efficiently over their employment-cycle. Intuitively, by paying short-tenure workers less than 
their marginal product, and long-tenure workers conversely more, the firm is able to keep the 
present value of wages equal to the present value of productivity. This provides incentives to 
workers that would be absent if they were to be paid a wage that more closely followed   4
productivity over their employment-cycle. Essentially, steep profiles provide ex post rents 
that the worker is reluctant to lose. If reducing effort increases the probability of involuntary 
termination, then steep profiles increase the cost of shirking, thereby encouraging workers to 
raise their effort level, and in this sense represent a form of efficiency wage payment [Lazear 
(1979, 1981)]. 
The competing explanation for positive earnings profiles is derived from the general 
human capital model. This posits that workers become more productive, and hence better 
remunerated, over time on account of investments in human capital or training. Training 
investments can be either of a general, readily transferable variety or of a specific, non-
transferable variety, both of which increase a worker’s productivity over time in the current 
firm. The human capital thesis suggests that it is the return to this investment, with initial 
relatively low and subsequent relatively high real wages, which causes the earnings profile to 
have an upward slope [Becker (1975), Ben-Porath (1967), Mincer (1958, 1974)]. Wage 
growth is therefore equivalent to the return to investment in on-the-job training plus the 
change (i.e. reduction) in the investment from period to period minus any depreciation of the 
stock of human capital. Larger amounts of on-the-job training will result in steeper wage 
profiles. Recent work in this area has emphasised the plausibility of other explanations. For 
example, search models generally predict that more time in the labour marker increases the 
chance of finding a better match and thus tends to be associated with higher earnings 
[Burdett (1978), Ruhm (1991), Jacobson and LaLonde (1993), Manning (1997)]. 
Alternatively, workers may prefer rising earnings profiles as a form of forced saving 
[Loewenstein and Sicherman (1991), Frank and Hutchens (1993)]. 
In what follows we set out a simple, two-period model of efficiency wages that 
highlights the relationship between monitoring and the wage-tenure profile. The model 
suggests that there is a trade-off between current period monitoring and the slope of the   5
profile. We then empirically test this prediction using a matched sample of British employer-
employer data. Our aim is to answer what is, perhaps, one of the key questions in labour 
economics: 
Personnel economics has grown over the past twenty years to become a major branch of labour 
economics. Although much has been learned, many important questions remain. For example, are 
worker wage profiles dependent on individual attributes or is the firm more important in determining 
wage growth. [Lazear (2000), p.611]. 
The paper is set out as follows: Section II outlines our theoretical model, Section III 
discusses our data and methodology, Section IV sets out our empirical results and Section V 
concludes. 
II. Theoretical  Model 
Assume for ease of analytical exposition that workers are homogenous risk neutral with a 
working life of two periods and separable periodic utility functions tt t ume =− , t = 1, 2, 
where  t m  and  t e denote income and effort respectively in period t. Assume further that 
employed workers make a discrete, all or nothing choice as regards the provision of effort to 
their employer such that  () 0, t ee = , where  0 e > . The firm has access to some monitoring 
technology defined through the function ( ) p k , where k denotes the value of resources 
devoted to monitoring and  () [ ] 0,1 pk∈  the probability that a shirker will be detected. To 
avoid unnecessary complications, we assume that the criteria on which this judgement is 
based are verifiable by an independent arbitrator such that there is no dispute about the firm’s 
assessment.
. We assume  () ( ) 0 dp k dk p k ′ = > ,  ( ) ()
22 0 dpk d k p k ′′ = < ,  () 00 p =  
and () 1 pk=  . It is thus technically possible for the firm to perfectly monitor worker 
performance. Since our focus of interest is not the optimal level of monitoring, we assume 
that production and monitoring technologies are such that it is always in the interests of the   6
firm to monitor imperfectly. Detection implies instantaneous dismissal and unemployment 
utility b.  
The firm’s problem is to maximize profits subject to the constraints that workers 
receives at least their reservation wage, 
r we b = + , and that, once employed, they do not 
shirk. A ‘spot-market’ employment contract will therefore necessitate workers being paid the 
lowest wage that satisfies the single period ‘non-shirking constraint’ (NSC): 
() ( ) 1 we p k b p k w −≥ +− ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦  (1) 
Satisfaction of (1) implies an optimal (vis. ‘efficiency’) wage of 
r wb e p w
∗ = +> , such that 
workers receive some employment rents but are just indifferent between shirking and not 
shirking.  
Now consider the specification of a two-period ‘lifetime’ contract () 12 , ww . In the 
second period of such a contract, the firm is faced with the same effort elicitation problem as 
those firms offering spot contracts such that  2 wwb e p
∗∗ == +  as before. In the first period, 
however, the firm can set  1 w  such that the worker’s lifetime NSC is satisfied: 
() ()() 12 12 22 1 ww ep kb p k wwe
∗∗ +−≥ + − +− ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦  (2) 
Undetected shirkers enjoy utility of  1 w  now and  2 we
∗ −  tomorrow - i.e. given 2 w
∗, workers 
will not shirk in period 2. Note the assumption that detected shirkers are fired and forced into 
permanent unemployment. This is an expository device. Allowing a more realistic scenario 
whereby detected shirkers receive unemployment benefits in period one and then have a 
chance of obtaining a (single period) employment contract in period two would not change 
our qualitative results. Satisfaction of (2) implies an equilibrium period one wage of   7
1 wb e















Intuitively, workers acquire rents on account of the firm’s inability to perfectly monitor. The 
firm, however, can reduce these rents by offering lifetime contracts that induce workers to 
queue up to access the second period wage that exceeds their reservation utility. It is apparent 











There is thus a trade-off between the quantity of resources devoted to monitoring by the firm 
and the slope of the experience earnings profile. 
III.  Data and Methodology 
Data 
Our data are derived from the 1998 and 2004 Cross-Section Workplace Employee Relations 
Survey (WERS).
 These are the fourth and fifth instalments of a Government funded series of 
surveys conducted at British workplaces. The previous surveys were conducted in 1980, 
1984 and 1990.  
  The sample of workplaces was randomly drawn from the Interdepartmental Business 
Register (IDBR). This is maintained by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) and is 
considered to be the highest quality sampling frame of workplaces available in the United 
Kingdom. The sample is stratified by workplace size and industry and larger workplaces and   8
some industries are over represented [Chaplin et al. (2005)]. A workplace is defined as the 
activities of a single employer at a single set of premises.  
  The survey comprises three main sections; the ‘Management Questionnaire’ (face-to-
face interviews with senior managers with day-to-day responsibility for employee relations), 
the ‘Worker Representative Questionnaire’, and the ‘Employee Questionnaire’. The survey 
population for the Management questionnaire is all British workplaces barring those in 
agriculture, hunting and forestry, fishing, mining and quarrying, private households with 
employed persons, and extra-territorial organisations.  
  The response rate in the 1998 (2004) Management Questionnaire was 80% (64%). 
The respective figure for the Employee Questionnaire was 66% (61%) [Airey et al. (1999) 
and Kersley et al. (2006) for reasons why the response rates differ]. At those workplaces 
responding to the manager survey, a questionnaire was presented to 25 randomly selected 
employees in workplaces with more than 25 employees or to all the employees in workplaces 
with fewer than 25 employees. 
  Changes in the nature of interest in employment relations led to substantial redesign 
of the 2004 wave. A major modification was the incorporation of small workplaces (i.e. those 
employing between 5 and 9 employees). There were also a number of changes to the format 
of the various survey questions [Kersley et al. (2006)].  
  For the purposes of our study we combine the data from the Management and 
Employee Questionnaires. Thus, our 1998 (2004) sample comprises 19578 (11270) 
employees linked to a set of 1744 (1509) establishments. Due to the stratified nature of the 
survey, we weight our estimates in order to be representative of the sampling population. 
Summary statistics of our variables of interest are presented in Tables 3a and 3b (Appendix). 
Methodology 
Our equation of interest is:   9
()
2
012 3 4 ij ij ij j ij j ij ij wt t m t m u αβ β β β β =+ + + + ⋅ +Χ + (5)   
where  1,..., iM =  and  1,..., j N =  denote individual worker and firm-specific subscripts 
respectively. The dependent variable,  ij w , denotes the log wage earned by individual i at firm 
j,  ij t denotes the employment tenure of individual i at firm j,  j m  denotes the level of 
monitoring within firm j,  ij Χ denotes a vector of individual regressors and  ij u denotes the 
error term. 
Following Leonard (1987), Gordon (1990, 1994) and Neal (1993), we proxy 
monitoring intensity via the proportion of supervisory employees within the firm. 
Supervisors, which include foremen and line managers, are defined in the WERS as ‘those 
people directly concerned with the detailed supervision of work’. The specific survey 
variable (Binvmang) is derived from the following question asked in both the 1998 and 2004 
‘Management Questionnaire’: ‘What proportion of non-managerial employees here have job 
duties that involve supervising other employees?’.
1 Managers were asked to indicate in which 
range their firm lay: 0% (None), 1 – 19% (Just a few), 20 – 39% (Some), 40 – 59% (Around 
half), 60 – 79% (Most), 80 - 99% (Almost all) and 100% (All). From this information, we 
constructed a 7-point supervision index (‘Monitoring’) where 6 (0) represents the highest 
(lowest) level of monitoring. The distribution of the index across the sample of firms in 1998 
(2004) is as follows: 0 [223 (263) firms], 1 [998 (880) firms], 2 [590 (625) firms], 3 [160 
(175) firms], [84 (64) firms], 5 [47 (21) firms], and 6 [50 (15) firms].
2 Full variable 
                                                 
1 In the 2004 survey, managers had the additional option of reporting the exact number of supervisors. One 
hundred and seven managers (4.7% of the sample) did so. We have translated these responses back to 
percentages. 
2 Drago and Perlman (1989) support the use of supervision as a proxy for monitoring, although they 
acknowledge that supervision may occur for non-monitoring purposes - for example, to co-ordinate production. 
Indeed, monitoring may not entail direct supervision but may instead rely on factors such as output 
measurement and piece rates. More problematic, the number of supervisors might be high because monitoring is 
difficult [Allgulin and Ellingsen (2002)] or that supervisors only spend a fraction of work time monitoring   10
definitions and summary statistics for the explanatory variables are detailed in Tables 1 and 2 
in the Appendix. 
We restrict our sample of employees in both the 1998 and 2004 surveys to non-
managerial and non-professional workers, thereby ensuring that we do not conflate 
supervisors with managers. The 2004 survey, but not the 1998 survey, explicitly asks if an 
employee has supervisory responsibilities. The specific question is: ‘Do you supervise any 
other employees? A supervisor, foremen or line manager is responsible for overseeing the 
work of other employees on a day to day basis.’ (Answer: Yes; No). We drop these 
respondents from the sample. Cross tabulations indicate that these latter were 
overwhelmingly managerial and professional staff. 
The discrete nature of our ‘raw’ monitoring variable renders statistical interpretation 
of its effect on the wage-tenure profile somewhat difficult. We therefore impute a continous 
value of monitoring for each firm in the sample by estimating a fitted version of (5): 
()
2
012 3 4 ˆˆ ij ij ij j ij j ij ij wt t m t m α βββ β β ε =+ + + + ⋅ +Χ + (6) 
5 ˆ jj j m β δ =Θ + (7) 
ˆ j m denotes the ‘fitted’ level of monitoring within firm j and  j Θ  is a vector of explanatory 
variables that influence this level of monitoring.
3 We are thus able to infer from  3 ˆ β  the effect 
                                                                                                                                                        
[Rebitzer (1995)]. Despite these problems, the relative paucity of data compels us to rely on the proxy defined 
above. One exception is Kruse (1992) who proxies monitoring by an employee reported measure of how often 
the supervisor checks his work. 
3 We experimented with a number of firm-specific explanatory variables in estimating equation (7). Our results 
were robust to this experimentation and our preferred specification is that set out in Table 4.   11
on the profile of a unit increase in monitoring. We estimate equation (6) via a linear 
probability model, the results of which are set out in Table 4 (Appendix).
4 
  Given the categorical nature of the wage variable, we estimate both (5) and (6) via an 
interval regression model. The actual question in both surveys is: ‘How much do you get paid 
for your job here, before tax and other deductions are taken out? If your pay changes before 
tax from week to week because of overtime, or because you work different hours each week, 
think of what you earn on average.’
5 
IV. Results 
Our results are set out in Tables 5 and 6 (Appendix).
6 For each sample we run two different 
specifications. Both specifications include the same vector of control variables with the 
exception of our monitoring variable. The first specification includes the ‘raw’ monitoring 
variable (Monitoring) derived from Binvmang. The second specification includes the 
instrumented variable of monitoring (Fitted Monitoring). 
  Our results for both specifications across the two samples are consistent with the 
standard human capital model of wages and, for brevity, we do not discuss them. We instead 
focus on the salient feature of our empirical analysis, namely the relationship between 
monitoring and the shape of the wage-tenure profile. Considering Table 5, it is apparent that 
higher fitted monitoring (Fitted Monitorng) impacts negatively on the wage profile. Thus in 
                                                 
4 We also estimate a fitted version of (5) using an ordered probit model to predict monitoring. Our results from 
this exercise remain qualitatively the same and are available on request. 
5 Respondents in the 1998 survey were asked to place their pay level within 12 bands, chosen to approximate 
decile bands and the top and bottom 5% of the earnings distribution as estimated from the 1996 New Earnings 
Survey. The available bands were: less than £50, £51-£80, £81-£140, £141-£180, £181-£220,£221-£260, £261-
£310, £311-£360, £361-£430, £431-£540, £541-£680, £681 or more. The number of bands was increased to 14 
in 2004: less than £50, £51-£80, £81-£110, £111-£140, £141-£180, £181-£220, £221-£260, £261-£310, £311-
£360, £361-£430, £431-£540, £541-£680, £681-£870, £871 or more. We construct lower and upper bounds of 
wages by taking the mid-points of each band and then aggregating. 
6 Our results for 2004 are based on a sample of all workplaces surveyed. Restricting the sample to 
establishments with more than 10 employees, in order to render the sample comparable with the 1998 sample, 
does not affect our results. These results are available from the authors on request.   12
1998, a unit increase in Fitted Monitoring reduces the slope of the wage profile by 1.7 
percent for each year of tenure. Considering Table 6, both Monitoring and Fitted Monitoring 
impact negatively on the wage-tenure profile. In 2004, a unit increase in Fitted Monitoring 
reduces the slope of the profile by 2.2 per cent for each year of tenure. Our results show that 
increased monitoring therefore not only reduces the slope of the wage tenure profile, but it 
does so more for employees with longer tenure. 
  Figures 1 to 4 illustrate wage-tenure profiles for the two estimated regressions across 
the two survey years. In Figure 1 and Figure 3 we simulate four wage-tenure profiles 
representing four values of our ‘raw’ monitoring variable (i.e. Monitoring = 0, Monitoring = 
1, Monitoring = 3, Monitoring = 6). In Figure 2 and Figure 4 we simulate four wage-tenure 
profiles representing four values of our ‘fitted’ monitoring variable (i.e. Fitted Monitoring = 
0,  Fitted Monitoring = Minimum, Fitted Monitoring = Mean, Fitted Monitoring = 
Maximum). The minimum, mean and maximum values of Fitted Monitoring for 1998 (2004) 
were 0.354 (0.229), 1.471(1.345) and 2.775 (0.928)
7 
  It is apparent from Figures 1 to 4 that despite controlling directly for human capital 
and demographic variables, and indirectly for a battery of firm-specific variables, there is a 
significant and consistent negative relationship between monitoring and the slope of the 
wage-tenure profile. In Figure 1, for example, wages peak at 13.2 years of tenure when 
Monitoring = 0. When Monitoring = 1, the peak occurs at 12.5 years, falling to 10.4 years 
and 8.3 years as Monitoring = 3 and Monitoring = 6 respectively. Our analysis thus suggests 
that firms are able to economise on future wage costs by devoting more resources to current 
period monitoring. 
                                                 
7 Note that for ease of graphical exposition, we have set all constants to zero. This has the effect in some cases 
of generating a negative profile at certain levels of tenure. Profiles would remain positive if we set the constants 















































Figure 2: WERS 1998– Fitted Monitoring 
 












































Figure 4: WERS 2004– Fitted Monitoring 
Our results also exhibit an insignificant (positive) relationship between Monitoring (Fitted 
Monitoring) and LnWage in both 1998 and 2004. This is in line with the existing, somewhat 
ambiguous, evidence on the relationship between monitoring and wages [Goerke (2001), 
Walsh (1999)]. Increased levels of monitoring have been found to impact both positively and 
negatively on wages, with negative effects being found for high effort workers [Strobl and 
Walsh (2007)].   15
V. Final  Comments 
Efficiency wage theory predicts that firms can elicit effort from their employees by paying 
supra-competitive (i.e. efficiency) wages and/or by devoting resources to monitoring. 
Another option available to firms is to tilt the remuneration package over time such that the 
prospect of higher future earnings acts as a deterrent to current period shirking. It follows, 
therefore, that a potential trade-off, and one not hitherto investigated in the literature, is that 
between the level of monitoring and the shape of the wage-tenure profile. 
  We have explored these predictions using two cross-section surveys of matched 
employer-employee data for Britain. Our results suggest an inverse relationship between the 
level of monitoring and the slope of the wage-tenure profile, and may be interpreted as 
further evidence of efficiency wage theory. They also support the view that it is agency rather 
than human capital considerations that drive the wage-tenure profile. It would appear that 
British establishments elicit optimal effort from their employees by trading off higher current 
period monitoring against future wage rents. Whether or not this strategy is replicated by 
firms in other countries is an issue for future research. 
   16
Appendix 
 
Table 1: Variable List and Definitions - Employee Questionnaire 
Variable   Definition 
Individual Characteristics 
Female  Female, (0/1) dummy 
Ethnicity  Ethnic minority: Black (Caribbean, African, other), Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Chinese,  (0/1) dummy  
No married  Current marital status, (0/1) dummy 
Disabled  Long standing health problems or disabilities which limit work, home or leisure time, (0/1) dummy 
Academic Qualifications 
Low CSE  GCSE (grades D-G), (0/1) dummy 
High CSE  GCSE (grades A-C),  (0/1) dummy 
A-Level  A level or equivalent,  (0/1) dummy 
Degree  Degree or equivalent, (0/1) dummy 
Postgraduate  Postgraduate degree or equivalent,  (0/1) dummy 
Vocational  Recognised vocational qualifications (i.e. trade apprenticeship, NVQs, City and Guilds Certificate), (0/1) 
dummy 
Job Characteristics   
LnWage  Log Average Gross Weekly Wages 
Lower  Log of lower bound of each of 12 wage bands, (14 bands in 2004)  
Upper   Log of upper bound of each of 12 wage bands, (14 bands in 2004) 
Tenure  Years at this workplace (mid-points of 5 bands) 
Tenure-Sq/100  Tenure squared divided by 100 
Fixed-Term  Employed on a fixed term contract, (0/1) dummy 
Temporary  Employed on a temporary contract, (0/1) dummy 
Union Member   Employee is a trade union member, (0/1) dummy 
Occupational Categories 
Technical Associate  professional and technical, (0/1) dummy 
Clerical  Clerical and secretarial (typist, postal clerk, secretary), (0/1) dummy 
Crafts  Craft and skilled service (tool maker, electrician, fitter), (0/1) dummy 
Services  Personal and protective service (police officer, bar staff), (0/1) dummy 
Sales  Sales (till operator, sales assistant), (0/1) dummy 
Operatives  Operative and assembly (assembly line worker, packer, truck driver), (0/1) dummy 
Training Dummies   
Less than 1 day  Less than 1 day, (0/1) dummy 
1 to less 2 days  1 to less than 2 days, (0/1) dummy 
2 to less 5 days  2 to less then 5 days, (0/1) dummy 
5 to less 10 days  5 to less than 10 days, (0/1) dummy 
10 days or more  10 days or more, (0/1) dummy   17
 
Table 2: Variable List and Definitions - Management Questionnaire 
Variable   Definition 
Establishment Characteristics 
Monitoring  % of non-managerial employees who are supervisors vis: All (100%), Almost all (80-99%), 
Most (60-89%), Around half (40-59%), Some (20-39%), Just a few (1-19%), None (0%)  
Lnsize  Log of the total number of employees at the establishment 
Percentage of part-time employees  % of part-time employees 
Percentage non-whites  % of employees from non-white ethnic background 
Trade union density  % of employees who are trade union members 
Percentage of dismissed employees  % of permanent employees who were dismissed the last 12 months (full and part time) 
Percentage of redundant employees    % of permanent employees who were made redundant the last 12 months (full and part time) 
Industry Classification 
Manufacturing  Manufacturing, (0/1) dummy  
Utilities  Electricity, water, gas, (0/1) dummy 
Construction  Construction,  (0/1) dummy 
Wholesale and retail  Wholesale and retail,  (0/1) dummy 
Hotels and restaurants  Hotels and restaurants,  (0/1) dummy 
Transportation  Transportation,  (0/1) dummy 
Financial  Financial services,  (0/1) dummy 
Other businesses  Other businesses,  (0/1) dummy 
Public administration  Public administration,  (0/1) dummy 
Education  Education,  (0/1) dummy 
Health  Health,  (0/1) dummy 
Regional Dummies  10 region dummies (Standard Statistical Region) 
Teamwork Dummies  Dummy variables if employees work in formally designated teams  
Teamwork1  Some-20-39%, (0/1) dummy 
Teamwork2  Just a few-1-39%, (0/1) dummy 
Teamwork3  None-0%, (0/1) dummy 
Training dummies  Percentage of experienced employees in the largest occupational group who have received 
formal ‘off-the-job’ training over the past 12 months  
Training1  Almost all,80-99%, (0/1) dummy 
Training2  Most,60-79%, (0/1) dummy  
Training3  Around half, 40-59%, (0/1) dummy 
Training4  Some, 20-39%, (0/1) dummy 
Training5  Just a few,1-19%, (0/1) dummy 
Training6  None, 0%, (0/1) dummy 
Average training in days  Number of days experienced employees spend in formal off-the-job training sessions over 
the past 12 months 
Days of training1  No training, (0/1) dummy 
Days of training2  Less than 1 day, (0/1) dummy 
Days of training3  1 to less than 2 days, (0/1) dummy 
Old establishment  The establishment has been operating at current or previous address for more than 5 years 
(0/1) dummy  
Pension scheme  Employees are entitled to an employer pension scheme, (0/1) dummy 
Market local  The establishment provides its goods and services  to the local  market, (0/1) dummy  
Market regional  The establishment provides its goods and services  to the regional  market, (0/1) dummy  
Market national  The establishment provides its goods and services  to the national  market, (0/1) dummy  
High competition  The degree of competition is very high/high, (0/1) dummy 
Ownership control1  The establishment is UK owned/controlled, (0/1)  dummy 
Ownership control2  The establishment is predominantly UK  owned (51% or more), (0/1) dummy 
Ownership control3  The establishment is UK and foreign owned, (0/1) dummy 
Ownership control4  The establishment is predominantly foreign owned (51% or more), (0/1) dummy 
Single establishment  Single independent establishment not belonging to another body, (0/1) dummy 
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Table 3a: Descriptive Statistics – Individual Questionnaire 
 1998  2004 
  Mean Std.  Deviation Mean Std.  Deviation 
LnWage (lower)  4.187 2.901 4.870 2.416 
LnWage (upper)  5.252 0.663 5.574 0.738 
Tenure (years)  6.532 5.496 8.806 5.363 
Tenure-sq/100  0729. 0.914 0.625 0.881 
Fitted Monitoring  1.471 0.353 1.350 0.392 
Low CSE  0.146 0.353 0.087 0.283 
High CSE   0.299 0.458 0.183 0.387 
A-Level  0.148 0.355 0.096 0.295 
Degree  0.073 0.260 0.097 0.295 
Postgraduate  0.101 0.102 0.023 0.150 
Vocational  0.368 0.482 0.555 0.497 
Disabled  0.065 0.247 0.116 0.321 
Technical  0.107 0.309 0.190 0.392 
Clerk  0.195 0.396 0.229 0.420 
Craft  0.131 0.338 0.104 0.305 
Services  0.103 0.303 0.090 0.286 
Sales  0.121 0.326 0.111 0.315 
Operative  0.162 0.369 0.115 0.318 
Temporary job  0.048 0.214 0.052 0.222 
Fixed-term job  0.027 0.163 0.026 0.159 
Minority  0.028 0.164 0.059 0.236 
Female  0.518 0.500 0.519 0.500 
Trade union member  0.388 0.487 0.304 0.460 
No married  0.237 0.425 0.249 0.432 
Training (less than a day)  0.103 0.305 0.101 0.301 
Training (1 to less than 2 days)  0.127 0.333 0.141 0.348 
Training (2 to less than 5 days)  0.160 0.367 0.189 0.392 
Training (5 to less than 10 days)  0.075 0.263 0.080 0.271 
Training (10 days or more))  0.080 0.272 0.075 0.263 
Number of Observations  19578 11270 
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Table 3b: Descriptive Statistics of Selective Establishment Characteristics
1 
 1998  2004 
  Mean Std.  Dev Mean Std.  Dev 
Size of the establishment
2  72.375 238.982 47.140 139.313 
Proportion part-time  0.320 0.304 0.329 0.301 
Union density  0.257 0.332 0.193 0.313 
Proportion of dismissals  0.019 0.046 0.015 0.040 
Proportion of redundancies  0.018 0.144 0.008 0.036 
Degree of competition in the market
3  0.599 0.490 0.568 0.495 
Single independent establishment  0.311 0.463 0.302 0.459 
Operating at this address > 5 years   0.905 0.293 0.920 0.271 
Employer pension schemes  0.678 0.467 0.681 0.466 
Manufacturing  0.156 0.363 0.129 0.335 
Utilities
3  0.003 0.052 0.010 0.032 
Construction  0.037 0.190 0.035 0.184 
Wholesale and retail  0.199 0.400 0.205 0.404 
Hotels and restaurants  0.060 0.238 0.054 0.226 
Transportation & communication  0.050 0.219 0.059 0.236 
Financial services  0.041 0.198 0.047 0.211 
Other business services  0.085 0.279 0.129 0.335 
Public administration  0.062 0.242 0.035 0.183 
Education   0.094 0.291 0.076 0.265 
Health  0.161 0.367 0.159 0.366 
Other community services  0.050 0.218 0.072 0.258 
Number of observations  19578  11270 
Notes: 1. Numbers are weighted; 2. Number of Employees; 3. Very High / High; 4. Electricity, Gas, Water. 
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Table 4: Fitted Monitoring (Linear Probability Model) 
Dependent Variable: Proportion of non-managerial employees supervising other employees. 
(Monitoring) 
                  1998                    2004 
  Coef T-stat  Coef T-stat 
Lnsize  0.102 2.27  0.053  1.38
Part time proportion  -0.066 -0.31  -0.127  -0.79
Percentage non-whites  -0.002 -0.31  -0.066  -0.29
Trade union density  -0.254 -1.52 0.077  0.37
Percentage of dismissals  -1.122 -1.23 1.267  1.20
Percentage of redundancies  -0.162 -1.49  -1.082  -1.75
Manufacturing  0.146 0.55  -0.073  -0.36
Utilities  0.032 0.11  -0.336  -1.08
Construction  0.356 1.26  0.281  0.97
Wholesale  0.148 0.55  -0.131  -0.73
Hotels and restaurants  -0.032 -0.12  -0.104  -0.51
Transportation  -0.222 -0.84  -0.374  -1.59
Financial services  -0.139 -0.49  -0.197  -0.87
Other businesses  0.111 0.40  -0.166  -0.91
Public administration  0.130 0.47  0.037  0.08
Education  0.293 1.08  0.447  2.03
Health  0.024 0.09  -0.062  -0.35
Teamwork1  -0.222 -1.48  -0.211  -1.35
Teamwork2  -0.375 -2.50  -0.149  -1.04
Teamwork3  -0.136 -0.98  -0.272  -2.60
Training1  -0.076 -0.40 0.157  0.92
Training2  0.118 0.69  0.210  1.17
Training3  0.176 0.68  0.109  0.63
Training4  -0.104 -0.70 0.042  0.28
Training5  -0.222 -1.45  -0.283  -2.27
Training6  -0.250 -1.40  -0.149  -1.07
Days training1  -0.839 -2.71 0.342  1.00
Days training2  -0.306 -1.72 0.199  0.65
Days training3  -0.172 -1.65 0.036  0.34
Old establishment  -0.261 -2.30  -0.140  -0.92
Pension scheme  -0.194 -1.61  -0.150  -1.54
Market local  0.005 0.04  -0.284  -2.31
Market regional  0.007 0.04  -0.159  -1.01
Market national  0.016 0.11  -0.288  -2.17
High competition  0.009 0.08  0.095  0.91
Ownership control1  -0.245 -1.87 0.297  2.25
Ownership control2  -0.063 -0.24 0.527  2.37
Ownership control3  -0.301 -1.23 0.004  0.02
Ownership control4  -0.225 -0.64  -0.097  -0.51
Single establishment  -0.040 -0.31  -0.056  -0.50
Regional Dummies  Yes Yes 
Constant  1.993 5.59  1.678  5.72
Sample Size  2152  2043 
Note: Estimated are weighted    21
 
Table 5: Interval Regression (1998) 
Dependent Variable: LnWage 
  Specification 1  Specification 2 
 Coeff T-stat Coeff  T-stat
Tenure  0.038 4.22  0.058 4.26 
Tenure-squared/100  -0.144 -3.03  -0.136 -2.93 
Monitoring  0.020 1.17  - - 
Monitoring*Tenure  -0.002 -1.24  - - 
Fitted Monitoring  -- 0.242 3.58 
Fitted Monitoring*Tenure  -- -0.017 -2.62 
Low CSE  0.074 2.90  0.076 2.98 
High CSE   0.122 4.47  0.122 4.51 
A-Level  0.155 4.79  0.159 5.03 
Degree  0.348 8.20  0.345 8.27 
Postgraduate  0.310 3.10  0.299 3.00 
Vocational  0.065 3.50  0.062 3.35 
Disabled  -0.104 -2.72  -0.108 -2.84 
Technical  0.559 12.35 0.548 12.41 
Clerk  0.578 17.38 0.573 17.57 
Craft  0.512 11.68 0.510 11.42 
Services  0.038 0.62  0.036 0.59 
Sales  0.036 0.65  0.049 0.90 
Operative  0.437 11.04 0.441 11.27 
Temporary job  -0.435 -7.69  -0.436 -7.74 
Fixed-term job  -0.237 -4.40  -0.242 -4.55 
Minority  -0.029 -0.55  -0.034 -0.62 
Female  -0.533 -18.15 -0.532 -18.25 
Trade union member  0.201 8.08  0.205 8.08 
No married  -0.184 -7.64  -0.177 -7.53 
Training (less than a day)  -0.001 -0.02  -0.006 -0.21 
Training (1 to less than 2 days)  0.072 2.72  0.067 2.55 
Training (2 to less than 5 days)  0.143 4.77  0.133 4.46 
Training (5 to less than 10 days)  0.224 6.13  0.210 5.91 
Training (10 days or more)  0.090 1.47  0.083 1.33 
Constant  4.690 82.20 4.368 39.34 
Log Sigma  -0.600 -27.45 -0.606 -28.26 
Number of Observations  19578 19578 
Wald Chi-Sq  1708.4528 1675.6928 
Log Pseudo Likelihood  -33975.67 -33891.02 
  Notes: Estimates are weighted and allow for the clustering of employees within establishments.    22
 
Table 6: Interval Regression (2004) 
Dependent Variable: LnWage 
  Specification 1  Specification 2 
  Coeff T-stat Coeff T-stat
Tenure  0.021 2.04  0.044 3.55 
Tenure-squared/100  -0.081 -1.44  -0.075 -1.33 
Monitoring  0.029 1.62  ---  --- 
Monitoring*Tenure  -0.004 -2.02  ---  --- 
Fitted Monitoring  --- ---  0.201  3.59 
Fitted Monitoring*Tenure  --- ---  -0.022  -4.03 
Low CSE  0.064 1.72  0.056 1.53 
High CSE   0.001 0.03  0.000 0.01 
A-Level  -0.070 -1.61  -0.072 -1.67 
Degree  0.169 3.67  0.163 3.56 
Postgraduate  0.244 3.16  0.240 3.06 
Vocational  0.062 2.82  0.060 2.76 
Disabled  0.008 0.24  0.009 0.29 
Technical  0.778 12.62 0.777 12.63 
Clerk  0.632 12.90 0.632 12.93 
Craft  0.570 10.30 0.568 10.20 
Services  0.031 5.88  0.294 5.68 
Sales  0.177 2.77  0.196 3.13 
Operative  0.541 9.26  0.548 9.34 
Temporary job  -0.465 -7.95  -0.459 -7.86 
Fixed-term job  -0.027 -0.52  -0.032 -0.63 
Minority  0.087 1.69  0.075 1.53 
Female  -0.505 -16.61 -0.502 -16.67 
Trade union member  0.200 6.12  0.200 6.12 
No married  -0.070 -2.27  -0.071 -2.28 
Training (less than a day)  -0.024 -0.64  -0.025 -0.66 
Training (1 to less than 2 days)  0.118 2.82  0.119 2.85 
Training (2 to less than 5 days)  0.127 3.72  0.128 3.76 
Training (5 to less than 10 days)  0.219 5.07  0.222 5.19 
Training (10 days or more)  0.124 2.32  0.122 2.27 
Constant  4.880 85.43 4.650 50.24 
Log Sigma  -0.497 -22.25 -0.500 -22.58 
Number of Observations  11270 11270 
Wald Chi-Sq  1184.6128 1230.8028 
Log Pseudo Likelihood  -776.296 -775.275 
  Notes: Estimates are weighted and allow for the clustering of employees within establishments.  
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